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ABSTRACT 
Over the past few years Queensland has suffered from a number of severe tropical cyclones, 
the most recent one being Marcia, that took place on 20th of February 2015. Damage bill of 
Marcia exceeded $50 million which included cost of repairing a number of damaged bridges. 
Failure of road infrastructure isolates communities from accessing essential services and 
commodities. This necessitated an urgent need to develop a systematic method of assessing the 
failure of the bridge component to improve the resilience of future bridges and provide base 
knowledge for developing emergency maintenance response. There are several methods 
available to investigate the bridge failure. Fault tree analysis (FTA) was selected considering 
its positive attributes over other methods. FTA was used to estimate the probabilities of failure 
of main components (Super Structure and Sub Structure) and elements of timber and concrete 
bridges. Secondary data (Level 1 and level 2 bridge inspection reports from the department of 
transport and main roads) before and after the cyclone Marcia were used in conjunction with 
expert consultations to construct fault trees for both timber and concrete bridges. Results 
indicated potential failure mechanisms and the degree of susceptibility of main components of 
timber and concrete bridges to cyclonic events. However, the extent of the data was not 
adequate to draw firm conclusions and further studies (i.e. probabilistic models) are 
recommended to strengthen the understanding of the complete dynamics of the bridge failure 
under cyclonic event.  
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CHAPTER1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
Over the past century, severe tropical cyclones have been reported to cause devastating impacts 
on properties, livestock, forests, buildings and infrastructure and caused major disruption to 
livelihoods of the communities that have been exposed to the event. In certain occasions it has 
taken lives, caused injuries and illnesses by restraining access to clean water and food.  
Natural disasters also cause significant impacts on road infrastructure and Bridges, making 
affected areas isolated from ground assistance. Queensland state controlled road network 
consists of 33,337 km of roads and 6,500 bridges and culverts (Kuhlicke 2010) which 
experienced the impacts of numerous disaster events over the past few decades.  
In 2011, Cyclone Yasi (category 5) caused significant damages to buildings and road 
infrastructure and timber bridges in North Queensland which accounted for 5% of the total 
damage cost. Damages to bridges can isolate communities for weeks in a natural disaster event. 
Resilience of critical road infrastructure such as bridges, culverts and flood-ways is vital in 
evacuation support activities for disaster response and recovery. 
Cyclone Marcia was expected to reach category 5, however when it reached the landslide, it 
has reduced to category 2/3 and when it reached Rockhampton it has further reduced to 
category 1 (James Cook University Cyclone Testing Station 2015). Despite lowering its 
intensity, the damage bill of cyclone Marcia approached to $53.4 million after a weeks’ time 
and at least 1000 homes suffered structural damage in the disaster and 385 properties have been 
deemed uninhabitable (Brisbane Times 2015).  
Devastating impacts of past cyclones have imposed tighter regulations on building codes and 
technological advancements and warning systems associated with cyclones, including the use 
of satellite imagery and meteorological modelling have shown marked improvements in recent 
years. 
Bridges in Australia have been designed to various standards as they were built in different 
periods. Bridges constructed in Australia after 2004 generally complies with AS5001:2004, 
which is mainly written for rural constructions (Pitchard 2013). Pitchard (2013) suggested that 
AS5001:2004 should be amended to include potential loads that may be applied in natural 
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disasters such as floating objects and bridge design should consider the context and 
connectivity and post disaster functionality. Ataei et al. (2010) suggested that probabilistic 
models of structural vulnerability are required to predict any damages to bridge infrastructure 
under cyclonic event. 
In Australia a few studies have been done to assess the resilience of buildings and road 
infrastructure under natural disaster events (Lebbe et al., 2014; Lokuge and Setunge, 2014). 
Information on the probabilistic response of road infrastructure during cyclones appears to be 
sparse in scientific literature.  
This study endeavours to understand the response of road infrastructure to tropical cyclone 
Marcia and comprehend their potential response to any tropical cyclones with high magnitude 
that might occur in the future.  
 
1.2 The Problem 
This project is anticipated to provide broad understanding on the nature of any damages to the 
road infrastructure caused by tropical cyclones. This includes the probability of different 
mechanisms of failure i.e. attributes of the cyclone and elements of the substructure and 
superstructure of the bridge. This broad understanding will provide a guideline for road 
engineers to improve the climatic resilience of the existing and future road infrastructure.  
 
1.3 Objectives  
• To investigate the damages directly and indirectly caused  by the cyclone Marcia on 
road infrastructure with special reference to bridges 
• To  determine indicative probable mechanisms of bridge failure under cyclone Marcia 
using fault tree analysis (FTA) 
1.4 Thesis out line 
The Thesis consists of six chapters. In chapter 1 the background and motivation of this 
research with the objectives is presented. In Chapter 2; literature review of bridge failure 
due to cyclones is discussed. It explains the anatomy of the tropical cyclones, the impact of 
cyclone on bridges and how bridges are damaged in a cyclone event.  
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It also contains the methods of analysis of bridge resilience. Last section of this chapter 
describes the Fault Tree Analysis method. 
Chapter 3 provides the methodology which was used to construct the Fault Tree Diagram 
(FTD) which was used to investigate the probabilities of bridge failure. It also illustrates 
the basic fault tree diagram which was constructed to determine the failure mechanism of 
a bridge. FTD was also expanded to find the bridge failure due to cyclone Marcia using 
basic events related to a cyclone. It also describes the method used to determine the 
probabilities of bridge component failure using basic events connected by logic gates. 
Chapter 4 explains the analytical methods used in assigning probabilities for bridge 
components and elements. It explains the methods of assigning probabilities for component 
and element failure and for basic events relevant to cyclone Marcia, using level 1 and level 
2 bridge inspection reports obtained from department of transport and main roads. 
Chapter 5 discusses the results and outcomes of the study. It provides a comparative                    
account on possible responses of two main components of a bridge and variations in the 
response of concrete and timber bridges to a cyclonic event. 
Finally, summary and limitations are in discussed in chapter 6. The outcome of this study 
provides a basic understanding of the probability of a timber and concrete bridge failure 
due to a cyclone. 
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Tropical cyclones 
Tropical cyclones generally develop as non-frontal low-pressure systems on warm waters in 
the tropics which have organized convection.  They can become intensified to generate 
sustained gale force winds of at least 63km/h (Fig 2.1). If the sustained wind achieves hurricane 
force of at least 118km/h, the system is defined as a severe tropical cyclone. The same 
phenomenon is known as hurricanes or typhoons in other parts of the world.  Based on the 
intensity, tropical cyclones are generally grouped into categories ranging from 1 (weakest) to 
5 (strongest), depending on the maximum mean wind speed as shown in Table 2.1  
If a cyclone has maximum wind gusts of >164 km/hr with very destructive winds, it is described 
as a severe tropical cyclone (BOM, 2012). Over the years severe tropical cyclones have been 
reported to destroy properties, livestock, forests, buildings and infrastructure and caused major 
disruption to livelihoods of the communities that have been exposed to the event. In certain 
occasions it has taken lives, caused injuries and illnesses by restraining access to clean water 
and food.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-1: Anatomy of a Cyclone (Bureau of Meteorology 2015) 
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James (2010) described the importance of the use of standard to investigate the factors that 
influence critical wind speeds in different locations. The amended version of (Australian 
Standard AS 4055-2006 provides useful guide on wind speed regions of Australia. 
 
 
Figure 2- 1: Wind speed regions in Australia, according to the Australian Standard AS4055-
2006 (Australian Standards, 2012) 
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Table 2-1: A description of the Category system used in Australia for Tropical Cyclones 
(BOM, 2012) 
 
Category Maximum 
Mean Wind 
(km/h) 
Typical 
Strongest 
Gust (km/h) 
Central 
Pressure 
(hPa) 
Typical Effects 
1 63 - 88 < 125 > 985 Negligible house damage. Damage to 
some crops, trees and caravans. Craft 
may drag moorings 
2 89 - 117 125 - 164 985 - 970 Minor house damage. Significant damage 
to signs, trees and caravans. Heavy 
damage to some crops. Risk of power 
failure. Small craft may break moorings. 
(e.g. Ului) 
3 118 - 159 165 - 224 970 - 955 Some roof and structural damage. Some 
caravans destroyed. Power failures likely. 
(e.g. Winifred) 
4 160 - 199 225 - 279 955 - 930 Significant roofing loss and structural 
damage. Many caravans destroyed and 
blown away. Dangerous airborne debris. 
Widespread power failures. 
(e.g. Tracy, Olivia) 
5 > 200 > 279 < 930 Extremely dangerous with widespread 
destruction. (e.g. Vance) 
Devastating impacts of past cyclones have imposed tighter regulations on building codes and 
technological advancements and warning systems associated with cyclones, including the use 
of satellite imagery and meteorological modelling have shown marked improvements in recent 
years.  
Potential risk of building failure in a cyclone can be crudely determined by comparing the 
building structure with the Australian Standard AS/NZS 1170.2 (2002), which is identified as 
the benchmark standard. It provides guidelines for structures that could be potentially affected 
by strong wind and less than 200 m high.  
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2.2 Impact of tropical cyclones on bridges 
Natural disasters cause devastating impacts on road infrastructure and Bridges, making affected 
areas isolated from ground assistance. In the United States, annual monetary losses due to 
tropical cyclones and other natural hazards have been increasing at an exponential pace, now 
averaging up to $1 billion a week (Mileti, 1999). 
The overall damage bill on repairing and replacing bridges damaged during Hurricane Katrina, 
including emergency repairs, was estimated to be over $1 billion based on damage inspection 
reports and bid estimates (Padgett 2008).  
Bridges in Australia have been designed to various standards as they were built in different 
periods. Bridges constructed in Australia after 2004 generally complies with AS5001:2004, 
which is mainly written for rural constructions (Pitchard 2013). Pitchard (2013) suggested that 
AS5001:2004 should be amended to include potential loads that may be applied in natural 
disasters such as floating objects and bridge design should consider the context and 
connectivity and post disaster functionality.  
In 2011, Cyclone Yasi (category 5) caused significant damages to timber bridges which 
accounted for 5% of the total damage cost. Two timber bridges required replacement due to 
the bridge being lifted and moved sideways by the flood water and adjacent segments of spliced 
piles were no longer connected together. There were broken timber piles and the approach road 
was also damaged (Pitchard 2013). 
A concrete bridge downstream of the dams on the North Pine River system had to be replaced 
as it underwent 4 m scouring at the river piers due to overtopping of the bridge. Subsequent 
load testing of the bridge showed that there was significant decline in the pile capacity of the 
bridge (Pitchard 2013). A steel girder bridge on the Mitchell River required replacement due 
to scour of the piers. Scouring of numerous abutments spill-through embankments was 
observed. Relieving slabs at bridge abutments were rendered un-functional and hence had to 
be replaced (Pitchard 2013). 
Cyclone Marcia was expected to reach category 5 but when it reached the landslide, it has 
reduced to category 2/3 and when it reached Rockhampton it has further reduced to category 1 
(James Cook University Cyclone Testing Station 2015).  
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Figure 2-
2: Cyclone Marcia Damaged Bridge in Monto 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 2-3: Cyclone Marcia Damaged Bridge in Gladstone Biloela Rd 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2-4: Cyclone Marcia Damaged Bridge in Mount Morgan 
Damage bill of cyclone Marcia reached $53.4 million after a weeks’ time and at least 1000 
homes suffered structural damage in the disaster and 385 properties have been deemed 
uninhabitable (Brisbane Times 2015). Cyclone Marcia has destroyed numerous properties in 
Yeppoon and road infrastructure including bridges in Monto (Fig 2.3), Gladstone Biloela Road 
(Fig 2.4) and in Mt Morgan (Fig 2.5) (Brisbane Times 2015). 
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2.3 How Bridges Are Damaged in a Cyclonic Event 
In a cyclonic event, bridges are mostly damaged by the storm surge that arises from the severe 
weather event. In most occasions bridges have failed due to unseating or drifting of 
superstructures which depend on connection type between decks and bents (Meng and Jin 
2007; Padgett et al. 2008; Chen et al. 2009). Padgett et al. (2008) studied bridge damage 
mechanisms using observations of 44 damaged during Hurricane Katrina. Their study revealed 
that major bridge damages during hurricane events are caused by the increased uplifting loads 
and impacts from debris and objects near the bridge, induced by the storm surges, and partially 
by high winds, scour, and malfunction of electrical and mechanical equipment due to water 
inundation. In a hurricane or cyclone, bridges are mainly damaged by (1) impact (2) 
catastrophic winds scouring, (3) Damages due to surge induced loadings  (4) Scouring (Padgett 
et al. 2008).  
a) Impact damage 
Impact damage is quite common bridges associated with large water ways. Impact damage is 
generally caused by floating objects i.e. debris, boats any items that gets transported due to 
flooding resulted from the intensive rainfall caused by cyclones. Post disaster inspections found 
that in most occasions, impact damage demonstrated itself in the form of span misalignment 
and fascia girder, fender, and pile damage (Padgett et al. 2008). 
 
A      
     B 
Figure 2-6, 2-6: Damage due to impact (Padgett et al. 2008). 
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b) Damages caused by catastrophic winds 
Suspension bridges are mostly vulnerable for wind damage. Long cable-stayed and suspension 
bridges must withstand the drag forces induced by strong winds. In addition, such bridges are 
prone to aeroelastic effects, which include torsion divergence (or lateral buckling), vortex-
induced oscillation, flutter, galloping, and buffeting in the presence of self-excited forces 
(Simiu and Scanlan 1986). Due to the aeroelastic and aerodynamic effects from high winds on 
long-span bridges, strong dynamic vibrations will be expected. Excessive vibrations will cause 
the service and safety problems of bridges (Conti etal. 1996; Gu et al. 2001).  In Australia there 
are very few suspension bridges. During Cyclone Marcia 2015, a timber bridge at Mt Morgan 
was found to be damaged by strong winds (Fig 2.5). 
c) Damages due to surge induced loadings  
Bridges with spans of the same or lower elevation than peak surge levels experience severe 
structural failure during hurricane events level (Irish and Cañizares, 2009). Under a storm surge 
the surface waves strike the superstructure and overcome the capacity of the anchorages 
(Douglass et al. 2006; Chen et al. 2009) and subsequent waves pushes the superstructures off 
of the supporting substructure. Robertson et al. (2007) described that hurricane damaged 
bridges experience reduced dead weight due to air trapped below the deck, which complements 
the hydro-dynamic uplift forces overcame the capacity of the anchorages. 
d) Scouring 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure2-7: Damage caused by scouring (Padgett et al. 2008) 
 
Another failure mode was due primarily to scour. Observations revealed that this damage type 
may or may not accompany the other damage modes inherent to storm-surge loads.  
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The scour damage that was readily visible to inspectors included scour and erosion of the 
abutment, slope failure, and undermining of the approach (Figure2.7) 
Scour results in foundation failure, which is caused by water flow eroding the foundations. 
When the foundation depth is shallow enough that the abutment or pier can move vertically, 
failure can occur (LeBeau and Wadia-Fascetti 2007). The major cause of bearing failure is 
extreme lateral forces that knock the superstructure off the bearings (LeBeau and Wadia-
Fascetti 2007).  
e) Damage in bridge connection 
Lehrman et al. (2012) tested three bridge connection types a) headed stud, b) clip bolt, c) 
through bolt (varying in elasticity and stiffness) against (1) vertical pseudostatic cyclic loading, 
(2) horizontal pseudostatic cyclic loading, (3) combined horizontal and vertical pseudostatic 
cyclic loading, and (4) combined horizontal and vertical dynamic loading on the basis of wave 
force histories from simulated hurricane wave loads on a 1∶5 scale bridge model.  According 
to those authors vertical forces alone represent the impacts on off-shore bridges.  
Lehrman et al. (2012) concluded that headed stud (HS) anchorage is the most robust of the 
three anchorages tested. It showed higher load capacity and had minimal ancillary damage to 
the prestressed concrete girders at the point of failure.   Failure of the HS anchorage was 
influenced by the performance of the steel studs, which allows high level of predictability and 
anchorage can be detailed to limit forces that could act on the substructure. 
The CB and TB anchorages exhibited concrete cracking and strand slip prior to failure which 
may impact long-term performance of the bridge after survival of the hurricane event. None of 
the three anchorages were able to withstand the simulated vertical loadings generated by 3.6 m 
wave as prescribed by AASHTO guide specifications (Lehrman et al. 2012).  
They also concluded that bridges that have CB, TB and HS connections have to be retrofitted 
with higher anchorage into the stem and end diaphragms.  
2.4  Methods of studying the resilience of buildings and road Infrastructure 
2.4.1. Vulnerability Index 
Risk of a natural hazard is depending on the intensity of the hazard and the vulnerability of the 
community and infrastructure. 
Risk = Hazard Intensity x Vulnerability (Holland 1993).   
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According to Varnes (1984), vulnerability refers to the potential degree of damage that can be 
expected based on the characteristics of an ‘element at risk’ with reference to a certain hazard.  
Even at present, this understanding of vulnerability has been complemented by encompassing 
‘the conditions determined by physical, social, economic, and environmental factors or 
processes, which increase the susceptibility of a community to the impact of hazards 
(Hufschmidt 2011). 
Vulnerability research has recently encompassed the challenge of integrating three different 
aspects, (1) components such as exposure, sensitivity or adaptive capacity, (2) different 
methods used in different disciplines, (3) target dimension of vulnerability (Fuchs et al. 2011). 
Vulnerability index (VI) refers to numerical values representing the quality of the structural 
and non-structural parameters which are considered to influence in the response of the building 
to a natural hazard (Belheouane and M. Bensaibi 2013). 
Vulnarability Index VI= ∑         
Where
  
n=number of items in a building structure, K = correlation coefficient of building 
response (Tesfamariam and Saatcioglu 2010).  
Pompe and Haluska (2011) described following components as factors influencing hurricane 
vulnerability index (HVI): (1) the level of exposure, (2) physical susceptibility to the hurricane, 
and (3) the hurricane’s frequency and intensity. They used the following formula: 
HVI = (E)*(S)*(H)      
Where E and S are the exposure and susceptibility to the hurricane, and H is likelihood of the 
hazard. Pompe and Haluska (2011) used a multiplicative model (Saaty 1980) since risk is a 
product of exposure, susceptibility, and hazard. The three elements are calculated with the 
following equations: 
E = wE1R E1 + wE2R E2 + wE3R E3   
S = wS1R S1 + wS2R S2 + wS3R S3  
H = wH1R H1      
Where R E1, R E2, and R E3 are population, housing units, and housing value; R S1, R S2, 
and RS3 are building code effectiveness, average building age, and vulnerability to sea-level 
rise; R H1 is hurricane probability; and w is the appropriate weight for each indicator (Pompe 
and Haluska 2011) 
23 | P a g e  
 
 
2.4.2 Damage index 
Blong (2003) used damage index to evaluate the performance of buildings which relies on the 
construction cost per square metre and a replacement cost ratio which is approximately equal 
to the costs relative to the cost of replacing a median-sized family home. In this research 
damage index for the infrastructure is defined as:  
Damage index = Cost for repair/Cost of replacement 
2.5 Methods of studying bridge  
2.5.1 Probabilistic models 
Studying the interactions between waves and bridge decks is important to understand the 
damages to bridges caused by storm surge. Fluid structure interaction is a complex 
phenomenon, due to air entrainment, turbulence and wave diffraction (Ataei et al. 2010).   
Ataei et al. (2010) suggested that probabilistic models of vulnerability are required to predict 
any damages to bridge infrastructure under hurricane event.  According to them the first step 
in developing the probabilistic model involves studying of dynamic responses of the bridges to 
hurricane induced loadings (Ataei et al. 2010).  Kaplan et al. (1995) proposed a mathematical 
model for predicting the forces on cylinders and plates of offshore bridges based on Morrison’s 
equation which considered drag and inertial terms. Morrison’s equation applies to structures 
that have large clearance between the deck and the water level.  
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Ataei et al. (2013) proposed following equation for the damage index for the bridges by using 
Longuet-Higgins (1983) joint probability wave function: 
 
    P [D>C|IM = s]                         Single valued IM 
                                        P [D>C|IM1= s1,…...., IMn =sn ]   Single valued IM 
 
[Equation 7: Damage Index Equation] 
                                       
Where D =structural demand, C = structural capacity, and IM =s= realization of the measure 
of hazard intensity for a single-valued IM and where IM1 = s1 to IMn = sn are the measures of 
intensity for a vector-valued IM. 
2.5.2. Risk Analysis and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
Current risk analysis methods and tools used in bridge maintenance can be grouped into three 
categories: field inspections, computer simulations, and real-time monitoring by using on-site 
sensors. The visual field inspections look for signs and symptoms of deterioration that could 
form into a failure. Real-time monitoring sensors, such as structural health monitoring (SHM) 
sensors, detect symptoms by a number of sensors on the bridge that can be connected to a 
computer network.  
Computerized models and simulations predict failure by using historical data and trends. Pontis 
(Futkowski and Arenella 1998; Cambridge Systematics, Inc. 2004) and artificial neural 
network (ANN) (Huang 2010) are two examples for computerised risk assessment models. In 
addition to historical data and trends, computerized knowledge based systems use expert 
opinions and results from other methods (e.g., field inspections).Despite the numerous practical 
advantages; risk assessment methods still have several limitations. Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
could be used to resolve majority of these issues. 
2.5.2.1. Advantages of FTA method 
Fault Tree Analysis could be used to address the limitations of risk assessment methods on 
following ways (Davis-McDaniel 2013): 
• Computerized mechanistic-based simulations and knowledge-based models require large 
amount of technical data. In FTA, if the exact information is not known, an educated guess 
or probable range can be used as input for the probability of basic events. 
P [Damage|IM] = 
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• Structural health monitoring, computerized mechanistic-based simulation, and in certain 
occasions visual inspection do not consider the chain of events that lead to bridge failure. 
The FTA models are developed using the chain of events; therefore, all the events that lead 
to failure can be identified through the analysis. 
• Majority of the visual inspections, computerized simulations, and computerized 
knowledge-based systems only evaluate the condition of individual bridge components 
instead of assessing the both individual components and their interrelationships.  
• Fault-tree analysis can also be used to assess the condition of individual components and 
the cause-and-effect relationships between different levels of events. 
• Only few computerized simulations are known to use or produce a visual model of the 
bridge system. On the contrary, FTA produces a fault-tree model, which illustrates the 
individual bridge components with the chain of events leading to their failure of the bridge, 
and the relationships between the various causal events and the individual bridge 
components. 
In addition to these advantages, FTA has the benefit of being fast and easy to use. Although 
FTA appears to have multiple advantages, it also comes with some limitations. FTA uses 
significant amount of background knowledge required on the bridge to construct the fault-tree. 
FTA also finds it difficult to compute probabilities for each event in the quantitative analysis 
due to the lack of research material or large amounts of data that require analysis. Visual 
inspections can be used to extract a majority of the data required for FTA; hence, FTA is best 
used in combination with visual inspections (Davis-McDaniel 2013). 
2.5.2.2 Fault Tree Analysis Method 
Whilst the damage index offers the level of damage to the structure, it doesn’t allow 
identification of the probability of bridge collapse at a given intensity of an extreme event. 
Fault tree method can be used to establish this relationship (FHWA 2011). It is also used as a 
prognostic tool in the design stage of a bridge which trouble shoots all possible events that 
could cause bridge to collapse (LeBaeu et al. 2007).  
Fault tree analysis (FTA) is a technique adopted to determine the root cause and the probability 
of failure of a structure due to an undesired event (Ericson, 2005). It can be used for risk 
assessment based on the likelihood and consequence ratings of various events of fault tree 
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(Williams et al., 2001). FTA is also a systematic analysis and often used in evaluating large 
complex dynamic systems to identify and prevent potential problems.  
FTA uses a graphical model based on logic gates and fault events to model the interrelations 
involved in causing the undesired event.  
 
Table 2-2: Fault tree gates and events (Zhu 2008) 
 
 
 
A logic gate may have one or more input events but only one output event. AND gate means 
the output event occur if all input events occur simultaneously while the output event of OR 
gate occurs if any one of the input events occurs. In this analysis, two fault tree diagrams were 
developed for pre stressed concrete bridges and the timber bridges.  
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To develop the fault tree diagrams, damages in each element of the bridges were identified. In 
this analysis, four symbols were used i.e. event, sub event, AND gate, and OR gate. 
One of the advantages of fault tree is its ability to unveil logical interrelationships of the bridge 
system through graphical depiction and Boolean algebra. The bridge can be modelled in its 
entirety, including element interactions, redundancy, deterioration mechanisms such as 
corrosion and fatigue, and environmental factors (LeBaeu et al. 2007).  
Fault tree method has both qualitative and quantitative analysis. Qualitative analysis derives a 
graphical Boolean depiction of the factors (events) which could lead to bridge failure (top 
event). Each event is connected to an upper-level event by an OR, AND, EXCLUSIVE OR, 
INHIBIT, and PRIORITY AND gates (Davis-McDaniel 2013). The events that constitute fault 
tree are classified as intermediate, basic, undeveloped, conditional, or house events (Fig 2-8). 
 
 
Figure 2-8: A Simple Fault Tree (Setunge et al. 2010). 
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Figure 2-9: Main Fault Tree Diagram for Scour and Channel Instability at Bridges (Setunge 
et al. 2010) 
 
2.5.3 Voting gate 
Voting gate means once M of N combinations of inputs occur, the output event 
Occurs, (Ericson, 2005). It is a combination of 	⋁ 
   AND gates with M inputs and OR gate 
with  ⋁ 
    inputs. 
 
 
Pf   = 1-1  	^	 
Where Pf is the system probability of failure, Pc is the component probability of failure, M is 
the number of failure of components and N is the total number of parallel components. The 
intensity of failure changes with M.N is easy to determine but M is a crucial factor for the 
accuracy of the calculation. 
The voting gate model can provide a connection of the quantitative results of component 
probability of failure due to initiation of a distress mechanism and the previous fault tree model  
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Figure 2.10.Voting gate diagram 
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CHAPTER 3 
METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Summary of the Methodology  
This chapter describes the methodology used to analyse the damaged bridges due to cyclone 
Marcia. A case study was carried out to identify all potential attributes of bridges that 
contributed or could contribute to failure such as bridge approaches, bridge surface, waterway, 
bridge substructure, bridge superstructure etc.   
Data used in this exercise was obtained from Department of Transport and Main Roads based 
on level 1 and level 2 pre-cyclone and post cyclone bridge inspections. Level 1 inspection 
indicates the damaged components and the morphology of the damage.  The level 2 inspection 
provides more details of the damage including its severity.  
The failure criteria was used to calculate the failure of two different types of bridges, Concrete 
and timber bridges. Inspection data were grouped based on the type of bridges as timber or 
concrete and evaluated for type of damage, age, standard used to design these bridges and 
separate databases were developed for each bridge type.  
The relationship between the collected data and the failure of the specific bridge of interest 
were analysed using fault tree method (Fig 2-8) (Setunge et al. 2010). Fault tree was 
constructed using data on element failure reported in level 1 and level 2 inspections in 
conjunction with the advice from experts in bridge engineering.  
This chapter has three sections 
A) Secondary Data collection and Pre Analysis 
B) Development of Fault tree 
C) An example of probability Calculation using the fault tree diagrams 
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3.2. Data collection 
Pre-disaster and post-disaster inspection data for damaged bridge were obtained from 
department of transport and main roads Rockhampton. Bridges inspection system (BIS) has 
been developed at TMR (Transport and Main Road) to keep all the records of the bridges 
nationwide. Level 1 and level 2 inspection reports were used to analysed the data. 
• Level 1 - Routine Maintenance Inspections 
• Level 2 - Bridge Condition Inspections  
3.1.1 Level 1 reports-Routine Maintenance inspection 
Purpose of the level 1 inspection report is to check the general serviceability of the structure, 
particular for the safety of the road users and identifying the emergency problems (Bridge 
Inspection Manual, 2004) 
Scope 
The scope of a Routine Maintenance Inspection includes: 
• Inspection of approaches, waterway, deck/footway, substructure, superstructure and 
attached services to assess and report any significant visible signs of distress or 
unusual behaviour, 
• Inspecting the active scours or deck joint movements. 
• Check of miscellaneous inventory items, including the type, extent and thickness of 
the bridge surfacing as well as details of existing services. 
• Recommendation of a Bridge Condition Inspection if warranted by observed distress 
or unusual behaviour of the structure. 
• Identify maintenance work requirements and record on the Structure Maintenance 
Schedule form 
Level 1 inspection was carried out immediately for all the damaged bridges after the cyclone 
Marcia. An example of a Level1 inspection report was attached in Appendix B. 
3.1.2 Level 2 - Bridge Condition Inspections 
Purpose of the level 2 inspection report is  to assess and rate the condition of a structure (as a 
basis for assessing the effectiveness of past maintenance treatments, identifying current 
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maintenance needs, modelling and forecasting future changes in condition and estimating 
future budget requirements). 
Scope 
The scope of the Bridge Condition Inspection includes: 
• Compiling, verifying and updating inspection inventory element items as appropriate. 
• Visual inspection of the principal bridge components (including measurement of 
crack widths, and an assessment of condition using a standard condition rating system 
as defined in the inspection procedures. 
• Visual inspection to identify any suspected asbestos containing material. 
• The inspection of timber bridges will be supplemented by a drilling investigation, and 
also include the identification and reporting of under sized timber members. 
• Reporting the condition of the principal bridge components and determining an 
aggregate rating of the structure as a whole. 
• Identifying and programming preventative maintenance requirements and recording 
on the Structure Maintenance Schedule form (M1). If access equipment is required to 
conduct the 
• Inspection, then routine / preventative maintenance may also be completed in 
conjunction with the inspection. 
• Requesting a detailed bridge inspection by a bridge engineer if warranted by apparent 
rapid changes in structural condition and/or apparent deterioration to condition state 4. 
• Underwater inspections of those elements in permanent standing water at the 
specified frequency. 
• Recommending requirements for the next inspection and nominating components for 
closer monitoring as appropriate. 
• Recommending supplementary testing as appropriate. 
. 
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An example of level 2 report was attached in Appendix C 
Level 1 Inspection data were available for 41 pre stressed concrete bridges, and 18 Timber 
bridges. Level 2 inspection reports were available for 6 concrete bridges and 8 timber bridges. 
Data were analysed separately for level 1 and level 2 inspection reports before and after the 
cyclone Marcia. An excel sheet was used to analyse the nature of damage for each element of 
the bridges individually (Excel sheets were attached in Appendix D Appendix E). 
3.2 Development of Fault Tree 
Bridges can deteriorate before the end of service life, if the design does not give the structure 
resilience to the environment to which it is exposed. However, deterioration of a structure does 
not necessarily imply structural collapse but could lead to loss of structural serviceability, such 
as poor durability and poor appearance with cracking, spalling, etc. Evaluation of the risk of 
failure of serviceability is important in decision making in relation to identifying different 
rehabilitation options for managing aging bridges. 
Table 3-1: Different symbols used in fault tree construction  
Symbols Name Usage 
 Circle Basic event  
 Triangle Transfer 
 AND Gate Output event occurs if all 
input events occur 
simultaneously 
 OR Gate Output event occurs if any 
one of the input events 
occurs 
 Voting gate M of N combination of 
inputs causes output to 
occur 
 
 
Components/elements of all the bridges can be grouped under two headings 
M
/N
 
34 | P a g e  
 
• Super structure 
• Substructure 
The main components of the Super structure and the Sub structure are shown below: 
Table 3-2: Components of a typical bridge structure  
 Bridge Component Description 
Super Structure Deck A bridge deck or road bed is the roadway, or the 
pedestrian walkway, surface of a bridge, and is one 
structural element of the superstructure of a bridge. 
The deck may be constructed of concrete, steel, 
open grating, or wood. Sometimes the deck is 
covered with asphalt concrete or other pavement. 
The concrete deck may be an integral part of the 
bridge structure (T-beam or double tee structure) 
or it may be supported with I-beams or steel 
girders. The main function of deck is to distribute 
Superstructure loads transversely along the bridge 
cross section. 
 
Girder A girder bridge, in general, is a bridge that utilizes 
girders as the means of supporting the deck. 
Girders distribute loads longitudinally and resist 
flexure and shear. 
Sub Structure Pier Piers are structures which support the 
superstructure at intermediate 
Substructure points between the end supports 
(abutments). Single-span bridges have abutments 
at each end that support the weight of the bridge 
and serve as retaining walls to resist lateral 
movement of the earthen fill of the bridge 
approach. Multi-span bridges require piers to 
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support the ends of spans between these 
abutments.  
 Bearing Bearings are mechanical systems which transmit 
the vertical and 
horizontal loads of the superstructure to the 
substructure, and 
accommodate movements between the 
superstructure and the 
substructure 
 Abutment Abutments are earth-retaining structures which 
support the superstructure and overpass roadway at 
the beginning and end of a bridge. abutments at 
each end which provide vertical and lateral support 
for the bridge, as well as acting as retaining walls 
to resist lateral movement of the earthen fill of the 
bridge approach 
 
 
Generally, the problems associated with concrete structures can be grouped into following 
aspects (Rendell et al., 2002):   
a) Initial design errors: either structural or in the assessment of environmental exposure. 
b) Built-in problems: the concrete itself can have built-in problems. A good example of 
this is alkali-silica reaction (ASR). 
c) Construction defects: poor workmanship and site practice can create points of weakness 
in concrete that may cause acceleration in the long-term deterioration of the structure. 
A common defect of this type is poor curing of the concrete. 
d) Environmental deterioration: a structure has to satisfy the requirement of resistance 
against the external environment. Problems may occur in the form of physical agents 
such as abrasion, and biological or chemical attack such as sulphate attack from ground 
water. 
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Considering above basic events, and using the analysis of bridge inspection data, and referring 
to the models used by Zhu (2008)  Johnson (1999) and Davis-McDaniel,etal  (2013)the following 
fault tree diagrams were developed for concrete bridges and timber bridges. 
Fault tree diagram for concrete bridges 
           
  
 
            
 
 
Figure 3.1: The main Fault tree diagram for concrete bridge 
 
 
 
     
     
 
 
Figure 3.2: Main Sub tree Branch for the deck failure  
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Figure 3.3: Main sub tree branch for accidental damage 
1-Train accident 
2-Marine accident 
3-Road accident 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4: Main sub tree branch for faulty construction 
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1-Wrong Alignments    6-Improper construction 
2-Scour     7-Wrong Strength 
3-Poor detailing    8-Wrong size 
4-Wrong load estimation   9-Poor detailing 
5-Inadequate Curing    10-Wrong type 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Main sub tree branch for age /durability 
1-Chloride exposure   6-High CO2 
2-Access to Reinforcement  7-High Reactive Humidity 
3-Reactive Aggregates  8-Permeable Concrete 
4-Poor material   9-High Wind Speed 
5-Excessive Moisture   10-Low reactive humidity 
11-Improper Curing 
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Figure 3.6 Main sub tree branch for extreme events 
1-Heat (Temperature of the environment)    5-Cyclone 
2-Fire        6-Flood 
3-High Traffic loads      7-Earth Quake 
4-Over Weigh Traffic 
The basic fault Tree diagram for the Deck, Girder, Abutment, Column and Head stock was 
similar. But the assigned probabilities for the basic events under each bridge component were 
different. For an example when considering the fault tree diagram for an extreme event, the 
probability of natural events result from flood, cyclone and earthquake varies along the deck, 
Girder, abutment, head stock and piles. 
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Fault Tree diagram for timber bridges 
The basic structure of the fault tree diagram for the timber bridges is similar to concrete bridges. 
The only difference occurs in faulty construction subtree and age/durability sub tree. 
         
  
 
            
  
 
 
Figure 3.7: Fault tree diagram for timber bridges 
 
 
     
     
 
     
     
Figure 3.8: Sub Tree Diagram for the timber deck Failure 
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The accidental subtree branch and the extreme event sub tree branch is the same as for concrete 
bridges. The only difference is that the concrete properties have been replaced by timber 
properties. In the timber bridge fault tree diagram, age/durability represent as a basic evet. This 
is because in timber bridges ASR, carbonisation, Cl2 corrosion and plastic shrinkage don’t 
occur. 
Fault tree Diagram for the concrete and timber bridge failure due to cyclone Marcia 
In this study concrete and timber bridge failure due to cyclone Marcia was only considered. 
Therefore the Fault Tree Diagram due to the cyclone Marcia was further developed to analyse 
the data.  
      
  
 
 
 
            
 
 
 
Figure 3.9: Fault tree diagram for timber bridges due to a cyclone 
1-Debris/Impact  
2-Surge induced loadings 
3-Scour 
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Figure 3.10: Fault tree diagram for concrete bridges due to a cyclone 
 
1-Debris/Impact 
2-Surge induced loadings 
3-Scour 
A bridge could fail due to a cyclone because of the impact damage blocked debris, surge 
induced forces and scour. The main purpose of this study is to find the basic event probabilities 
for super structure and substructure failure. To estimate and assigns probabilities for basic 
events, level 1and level 2 bridge inspection reports from Department of Transport and Main 
Roads (DTMR) were used. The Probability calculation is shown in the analysis section. 
 
3.3 Probability of failure of each element 
The fault tree model can be converted into a mathematical model to compute the failure, 
probabilities and system importance measures (Ericson, 2005, Mahar and Wilbur, 1990). The 
main logic gates used to combine the events are:  
• AND gate                                
• OR  gate 
Equation for AND gate is 
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P =∏       
 
Equation for OR gate is 
P =1∏ 1        
 
 Example of calculation of the probability of top event 
If the basic event probabilities are known (Basic events-Events happens at the very end of the 
Fault tree diagram and represent as a circle) Using the above two equation for OR gate, AND 
gate the probability of the top event can be calculated 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The probability of Occurrence of top event can be calculated as follows 
P(PS1) =P(PS3).P(PS4)   (AND gate) 
P(PS) =1-[1-P(PS1)].[1-P(PS2)]  (OR gate) 
For this example let’s take the probability of basic events as 0.01 and 0.001 
PS3 =0.01 
PS4 =0.001 
PS=A6 
PS1 PS 
2 
PS
4 
PS
3 
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Then the probability of PS1 is calculated as follows. 
PS1 =P (PS3).P (PS4) 
       =0.01*0.001 
       =0.00001 
Then the probability of the top event, 
 PS     =1-[1-P (PS1)]. [1-P (PS2)] 
          =1-[1-(0.01)]. [1-(0.001] 
          =0.0109 
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CHAPTER 4 
MODEL DEVELOPMENT 
 
4.1 Condition rating of the level 2 inspection reports 
The condition rating system reflects the performance, integrity and durability of the structure and its 
principal components. The assessment of the nature and extent of defects shall be detailed in the 
procedures as appropriate to each component type. The overall structure condition rating is based on 
the condition of its principal load bearing components. The condition ratings have been developed to 
represent the easily discernible stages of deterioration. (Bridge inspection manual, 2004) 
4.1.1 Assigned Probabilities for the condition states 
Qualitative ratings were extracted from the TMR Bridge Inspection manual and assigned 
probabilities were selected in consultation with the experts and resource personal with 
substantial knowledge and experience in the field of road infrastructure  (Expertise- Director 
of the infrastructure management and delivery section in Rockhampton, TMR, Two Structural 
engineers from TMR, two senior civil engineers from TMR, Rockhampton and Toowoomba, 
head of the department of civil engineering at CQ university, and Two senior lecturer in USQ) 
The majority (99%) of the experts consulted have agreed with the following approach in 
assigning probabilities;  
a) Change of condition state 1 to condition 2 is negligible. 
b) Change of condition 2 to 3 is a concern but it doesn’t need immediate action. 
c)  Change of condition 3 to 4 needs immediate action.  
d)  Condition 5 was allocated as the worst case scenario and normally before any element 
reaches condition 5; TMR immediately repairs that particular component/element or 
repair the whole bridge. Based on these general agreement assigned probabilities were 
chosen as below. 
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Table 4-1: Qualitative rating for the condition levels of a bridge 
 
Condition levels Qualitative Rating Assigned Probability 
1 Good 7% 
2 Fair 12% 
3 Poor 25% 
4 Very poor 50% 
5 Worst 65% 
 
Table 4-2: Change Of probabilities according to the change of condition state 
 
Change of condition state of a bridge 
component 
Change of probability 
Condition state 1-condition state 2 0.05   (12%-5%) 
Condition state 1-condition state 3 0.18 (25%-7%) 
Condition state 1-condition state 4 0.43 (50%-7%) 
Condition state 2-condition state 3 0.13   (25%-12%) 
Condition state 2-condition state 4 0.38   (50%-12%) 
Condition state 3-condition state 4 0.25   (50%-25%) 
 
4.1.2 Reasons for allocating the assigned probability for each condition levels 
As shown in the above table the change of probability from condition 1 to 2 was given as 
5%.This is because according to the TMR procedures the change of condition from 1 to 2 is 
negligible. Change of condition state 2 – 3 is a concern; hence the probability difference 
between condition levels 2 to 3 was taken as 13% (25% -12%). If the condition state changes 
from 3 to 4, it is a main concern and immediately need to repair the component. Therefore the 
change of possibility from condition state 3 to 4 is chosen as 25% (50%-25%) 
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4.2 Example for Probability calculations: Roubdstone Timber Bridge 
(structure ID 718) 
4.2.1 Calculations for girder failure of span 1 
Table 4-3: Change of condition state for girders in span1  
 
No of 
Girders 
Span1 conditions  state before the 
cyclone 
Span 2 conditions  state after the 
cyclone 
Probability of failure 
of girders in span1 
7 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
  5 2     7 0.343 
 
Probability calculation for the girders of span1 
a) 
Condition state before the cyclone Marcia     = 2 (12%)  
Condition state after the cyclone Marcia     = 4 (50%) 
The probability difference between condition levels    = (0.5-0.12) 
           
                       =0.38 
Number of girders changed from condition 2 to condition 4   = 5 
Therefore the probability of failure of girders in span 1   = 0.38*5 
            
          =1.9 (result 1) 
b) 
Condition state before the cyclone Marcia     = 3 (25%)  
Condition state after the cyclone Marcia     = 4 (50%) 
The probability difference between condition levels    = (0.5-0.25) 
            
          =0.25 
Number of girders changed from condition 3 to condition 4   = 2 
Therefore the probability of failure of girders in span 1   =0.25*2 
 
          =0.5 (Result 2) 
Therefore the probability of all girder failure for span 1   =1.9 + 0.5 (result 
1+result 2)         =2.4 
Total number of girders changed the existing condition   =7 
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The probability of a girder failure      =2.4/7 
          =0.343 
4.2.2 Calculations for girder failure of span 2 
Table 4.4: Change of condition state for girders in span2  
No of 
Girders 
Span2 conditions  state before the 
cyclone 
Span 2 conditions  state after the 
cyclone 
Probability of failure 
of girders in span1 
7 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 
  5 1 1    7 0.3583 
 
a) 
Condition state before the cyclone Marcia     =2 (12%)  
Condition state after the cyclone Marcia     =4 (50%) 
The probability difference between condition levels    = (0.5-0.12) 
          = 0.38 
Number of girders changed from condition 2 to condition 4   = 5 
Therefore the probability of failure of girders in span 2   =0.38*5 
            
          =1.9 (result 1) 
b) 
Condition state before the cyclone      = 3 (25%)  
Condition state after the cyclone      = 4 (50%) 
The probability difference between condition levels    = (0.5-0.25) 
            
          =0.25 
Number of girders changed from condition 3 to condition 4   = 1 
Therefore the probability of failure of girders in span 2   =0.25*1 
 
          =0.25 (Result 2) 
Therefore the probability of all girder failure for span 2   =1.9+0.25(result 
(result 1+result 2)         =2.15 
 
Total number of girders changed it existing condition   =6 
The probability of a girder failure of span 2     = (2.15)/6 
          =0.3583 
49 | P a g e  
 
Same method can be applied for span 3 and span 4.The result are as below. 
The probability of a girder failure of span 3   =0.3428 
The probability of a girder failure of span 4   =0.331 
 
4.2.3 Calculation of the probability of girder failure using span1, span2, span3, span4 
results 
The probability of a girder failure of span 3 due to cyclone Marcia  =0.343 
The probability of a girder failure of span 4 due to cyclone Marcia  =0.3583 
The probability of a girder failure of span 3 due to cyclone Marcia  =0.3428 
The probability of a girder failure of span 4 due to cyclone Marcia  =0.331 
Total                 = (0.343+0.3583+0.3428+0.331) 
          =1.3746 
Total number of span        =4 
Total number of girder       =7 
 
                                                             
PGS                                          =
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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=1.3746/ (7*4) 
     =0.049 
Where PGS -Probability of girder failure for all span 
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4.2.4 Probability of a girder failure for all bridges 
Using the same method probability of a girder failure for eight timber bridges were calculated. 
The results are shown below. 
Table 4-5: Results from the excel sheet for the girder failure 
 
Bridge Probability of a girder failure for all bridges 
1 0 
2 0 
3 0 
4 0.01 
5 0.032 
6 0.049 (calculation for this bridge shown above) 
7 0 
8 0.01 
Total 0.101 (0+0+0+0.01+0.032+0.049+0+0.01) 
 
 
 
In the above table, the probability of failure for four bridges stated as 0.This because the 
condition state of girders haven’t changed before and after the cyclone Marcia for all the span 
in those bridges. 
 
      	
PG                                                                 =
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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$'#	 	"!#%
 
 
     = (0.101)/8  
= 0.013 
 
Where P G -Probability of a girder failure for timber bridges   
 
Using the same method the probability of failure of the deck, piles, abutments, and headstock 
were calculated. 
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4.3 Method of calculating the basic events for the FTD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The probability of the girder failure was calculated as 0.013.In the fault tree diagram the girder 
failure was divided into two basic events, debris/impact damage and surge induced loadings. 
To find the basic event probabilities, top to bottom method was used. 
To assign the weight for the basic event, the same expert consultation method mentioned in the 
previous section was used. The level 1 inspection report was also used to assign the weight for 
debris and impact damage. 
 Level 1 inspection report 
41 concrete bridges and 18 timber bridges were analysed before and after the cyclone Marcia 
using the level 1 inspection reports. According to the data results as follows 
 
Timber bridges 
Total number of bridges considered   -18 
Number of Impact damage     - 6 
Number of debris damaged     -3 
Scour (Bed, spill through, bedside)   -9 
 
Concrete bridges 
Total number of bridges considered   -41 
Number of Impact damage     - 8 
Number of debris damaged    -3 
Girder failure due to cyclone  
Debris/ 
Impact 
Surge 
induced 
Loading 
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Scour (Bed, spill through, bedside)   -25 
 
Using above results and consulting expertise (Section 4.3) the weight of a girder failure due to 
debris/ impact and surge induced forces were assigned as below. In a cyclonic event, bridges 
are mostly damaged by the storm surge that arises from the severe weather event. In most 
occasions bridges have failed due to unseating or drifting of superstructures which depend on 
connection type between decks and bents (Meng and Jin 2007; Padgett et al. 2008; Chen et al. 
2009). 
Girder failure due debris/impact   =25% 
Girder failure due to surge induced forces  =75% 
 
Probability calculation for the basic events 
In the above fault tree diagram (Figure 1) the probability of the girder failure due to a cyclone 
was connected by two basic events; debris/impact and surge induced loadings. OR gate was 
used to connect the secondary branches. Using the equation for the OR gate probability of the 
basic two events can be calculated as follows. 
Probability of a girder failure      = PD  
Probability of a girder failure due to debris/impact   = Pd 
Probability of a girder failure due to surge induced loadings = Pi 
  
PD  =1.3% (Calculated probability from level 2 
inspection report) 
Pd =25% (assigned probabilities using level 1inspection 
reports and expertise knowledge) 
Pi =75% (assigned probabilities using level 1inspection 
reports and expertise knowledge) 
 
P
 
=1-  [(1- Pd)×(1-Pi)]      [Equation 8:Equation for the 
OR gate] 
0.013 =1-[(1-0.25 Pd)(1-0.75Pd)] (Pi can be replaced as               
0.75 Pd) 
0.013                                        =1-[1-0.75Pd-0.25Pd+0.1875 ( Pd)2] 
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0.1875 (Pd) 2 –Pd +0.013  =0 
By solving this equation:  
Calculated Pd is      = 0.0143 
0.25 Pd       = 0.75 Pi 
Pd       = (0.75 Pi)/0.25  
       = 3 Pi 
 
Therefore Pi   is     =0.0143×3 
       =0.043 
Probability of a girder failure of a timber bridge due to debris/impact  =0.0143
 
Probability of a girder failure of a timber bridge due to surge induced loadings = 0.043 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Using the same method the probability of basic events for each bridge components can be 
calculated. 
Table 4-6: Basic events used to calculate the main element failure of a bridge 
 Bridge component Basic events 
 Super structure Girder Debris/Impact, surge  
Deck Debris/impact, surge 
Sub structure Piles Debris/impact, surge, scour 
Columns Debris/impact, surge, scour 
Abutments Debris/impact, surge, scour 
Girder (0.013) 
Debris/ 
Impact 
(0.0143) 
Surge 
induced 
loading 
(0.043) 
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As shown in the table 4-6, impact/debris and damages caused by surge induced loadings were 
only considered as basic events for the girders and deck failure. But for substructure 
components, debris/impact, surge induced loadings and scour were selected as basic events. 
When selecting the probabilities of basic events for substructure, results from the level 1 
inspection reports (Mentioned above refer to page 43) and expert knowledge was used. 
Assigned probabilities for piles are shown below: 
Pile failure due debris/impact    =25% 
Pile failure due to surge induced loadings        =45% 
Pile failure due to scour    =35% 
All the basic event for the components of the substructure failure are connected using an OR 
gate. Therefore probabilities of the basic events were calculated using the same equation and 
same method described in earlier section (The method used to calculate the probabilities of 
basic events of the girder). Same method was applied to calculate the probabilities for the 
concrete bridges. 
 
T-tests 
Unbalanced paired t-tests were used to compare the mean probability values of selected 
elements of timber and concrete bridges. 
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
 
5.1. General Observations 
Post cyclone inspection data (level 1 inspection) for 59 bridges (41 were concrete bridges, 18 
timber bridges), were tabulated for analysis.  
 
Figure 5-1: Comparison of super structure and substructure failure between concrete and 
timber bridges 
 
Preliminary observations showed that there are no significant difference between potential 
cyclones induced damage on superstructure and substructure on both timber and concrete 
bridges. Potential cyclone related impact on substructure was most prevalent in timber bridges 
(˜66 %) (Fig 5-1). 
However, pre-cyclone level two inspection data indicated that majority (62%) of the timber 
bridges were in exhausted state (condition 3). After the cyclone the condition of 82% of the 
timber bridges reached critical state which required immediate attention.  
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5.2  Results from Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) 
Level 1 inspection data for 41 concrete bridges and 18 timber bridges and level 2 inspection 
data for 8 timber bridges and 6 concrete bridges were used in the FTA analysis. Below table 
shows the calculated probabilities for the concrete and timber bridge failures due to cyclone 
Marcia. 
Fault tree analysis for the selected concrete and timber bridges using cyclonic events suggested 
that in general timber bridges are more susceptible for forces of natural disasters (P timber 
=0.17, P concrete =0.14 ).  
Probability values for basic events selected to construct fault tree for concrete bridges are 
closely in line with the reported probability values in the study conducted by Mc Daniel et al 
.(2013) 
5.2.1 Failure of timber bridges under cyclone events 
Fault tree analysis for timber bridges indicated that substructure is more susceptible for cyclone 
induced damage than super structure (Table). Failure of substructure was found to have mostly 
influenced by damages to headstock.  
Table 5-1: Probability of main element failure for timber bridges 
 
Probability of component failure of a timber bridges  
Super structure 
0.06898 
Substructure 
0.1121 
Deck Girder Piles Abutments Head stock 
0.057 0.0127 0.0297 0.01423 0.0718 
 
Results suggested that superstructure failure in timber bridges under cyclonic even is mainly 
due to deck failure which is likely to have caused by surge induced loadings (Table 5-1, Table 
5.2) 
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Table 5-2: Probability of basic events of the super structure for timber bridges 
 
 
A number of authors have also reported and discussed similar observations where super 
structure failure was found to be influenced by damage or displacement of the deck (Douglass 
et al. 2006; Chen et al. 2009).  Douglass et al. 2006 suggested that surface waves generated by 
storm surge, can overcome the anchorage and subsequent waves dislocate them causing bridge 
to collapse.   
Fault tree analysis for timber bridges indicated the substructure failure is mostly influenced 
by surge forces followed by weakness caused by scouring (Table 5-3). 
Table 5-3: Probability of basic events of the sub structure for timber bridges 
Surge induced loading seems to have caused the majority of the substructure elements failures. 
The intensity of the damage may have been compounded due to the age of these timber bridges 
in question as anchorage and joints may have weakened over the years. Some of the bridges 
that have been included in this study are as old as 35 years.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Super structure failure of timber bridges (basic event probabilities) 
Deck Girder 
Debris/Impact Surge Induced Loading Debris/Impact 
Surge Induced 
Loading 
0.01439 0.04319 0.00319 0.00956 
Sub structure failure of a timber bridge  (basic event probabilities) 
Piles Abutment Head stock 
Surge Scour Impact Surge Scour Impact Surge Scour Impact 
0.013426 0.010442 0.00596 0.0062 0.00483 0.00276 0.032832 0.025536 0.01459 
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5.2.2 Failure of concrete bridges under cyclonic events 
 
Table 5-4: Probability of main element failure for concrete bridges 
 
Probability of component failure of concrete bridges  
Super structure 
0.00958 
Substructure 
0.13934 
Deck Girder Piles Abutments Head stock 
0.0036 0.006 0.0035 0.1327 0.004167 
 
 
According to the FTA (Table 5-4), probability of substructure failure in concrete bridges at the 
presence of cyclonic forces is slightly greater than that of superstructure failure. Results did 
not indicate marked difference in the susceptibility of super structure and substructure of 
concrete bridges. Unlike timber bridges, failure of superstructure in concrete bridges has found 
to be mainly caused by girder damage. Similar to timber bridges, surge induced loadings have 
caused super structure element failure (Table 5-5) 
 
Table 5-5: Probability of main element failure for concrete bridges 
 
Results (Table 5-6) suggested that surge induced loading closely followed by structural 
weakness caused by souring are responsible for substructure element failure. In contrast to 
timber bridges, abatement failure has shown significant impact on substructure failure (Table 
5-6)  
Table 5-6: Probability of basic events of the sub structure for concrete bridges 
 
Sub-structure failure for concrete bridges(basic event probabilities) 
Piles Abutment Head stock 
Surge Scour Impact Surge Scour Impact Surge Scour Impact 
0.001466 0.00114 0.000652 0.06197 0.0482 0.02754 0.001869 0.00145 0.00083 
Super structure failure for concrete bridges (basic event probabilities) 
Deck Girder 
Debris/Impact Surge Induced Loading Debris/Impact 
Surge Induced 
Loading 
0.00065 0.00195 0.001502 0.004505 
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Probabilities of failure for both timber bridges and concrete bridges as a direct or indirect 
impact from cyclone were calculated by using the probabilities in the table. 
 
• The probability of a timber bridge failure due to a cyclone  =0.17 
 
• The probability of a concrete bridge failure due to a cyclone  =0.14 
 
 
Probability of timber bridge failure due to cyclonic events is higher than that for concrete 
bridges. The main reasons for this may be due to age of the timber bridges. All the timber 
bridges studied for these case studies were built more than 35 years ago. The timber code during 
those days was different to the current standard. Components of timber bridges are vulnerable 
to decay if exposed to moisture.  
5.2.3 Comparison of the Responses of Timber and Concrete Bridges under Cyclonic events 
Timber and concrete bridges were found to demonstrate significant difference in the 
susceptibility of their superstructure to cyclonic forces (Figure 5-2). A strong possibility exists 
for the surge related vertical forces to lift or dislocate the deck of a timber bridge causing super 
structure to collapse.    
 
 
Figure 5-2: Comparison of super structure and substructure failure between concrete and 
timber bridges  
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Results indicated that substructure of concrete bridges is more sensitive to surge induced forces 
compared to that of timber bridges. However, it should be noted that this indication has been 
exaggerated by the probality of abutement failure in concrete bridges (Figure 5-3). If the 
probability values of abutements had been taken off, then the overall probability of substructure 
failure for conctre bridges would have been markedly less than that of timber bridges.  
Most conctere bidges do not have a relieving slabs for abutements, and show poor compaction 
of the appraches. Load distribution in timber bridges are differnet to that of concrete bridges 
and hence it impats on the piles of concrete bridges (Eberhard el al. 1993). Timber bridges due to 
its specific construction method have better anchorage in their abutments compared to that of concrete 
bridges resulting relatively higher resilience under surge induced forces. Due to this reason timber 
bridges can sustain longer under scouring.   
 
 
 
 
 
Results (Figure 5-3) indicated that the majority of the elements of timber bridges, have low 
resilience to cyclonic events compared to that of concrete bridges. However there was a marked 
variation in the probability of abutment failure in timber and concrete bridges, which impacted 
over all response of the substructure of concrete bridges.  
 
 
Figure 5-3 Comparison between main elements of the bridge component 
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Table 5.6: Comparison of mean probabilities of bridge elements in timber and concrete 
bridges using unbalanced paired t-test.  
Super Structure Sub Structure 
 Deck Girder Pile Abutment Head Stock 
Timber 0.056a 0.013a 0.0297a 0.007a 0.058a 
Concrete 0.0036a 0.006a 0.0035b 0.065a 0.004a 
Significance    P=0.03 P=0.05  
 
Unbalanced paired t-tests were used to compare the mean probability values. n=8 *Means 
followed by the same letter are not significantly different at the P<0.05 level. 
Resulted showed significant variations (P<0.05) in the failure of substructure elements which 
is consistent with the outcomes of fault tree analysis (FTA) results.  Probability of failure for 
other components were not found to be statistically significant (P>0.05). However, the extent 
of data was not adequate to draw firm conclusion.  
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUTION AND FURTHER RECOMMENDATION 
Existing data were not adequate to draw firm conclusions; however the resultant probability 
values from FTA were consistent with those values for the events in hurricanes that were 
reported by numerous authors in America. Based on the results following outcomes could be 
drawn: 
• Timber bridges appear to be more susceptible to cyclones compared to concrete bridges 
mainly due to the attributes of its super structure. However this difference in their 
resilience was not found to be statistically significant. 
• Surge induced forces are the main contributing factors for both super and substructure 
failure  
• Vulnerability of sub-structure (piles and abutments) of concrete bridges under cyclonic 
events is significantly greater than that of timber bridges due to the characteristics of 
abutments, method of construction, anchorage and load distribution.   
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Future recommendation 
 
Using further data for cyclones, FTA can be refined. Also the normal deterioration will have 
an impact on the effect due to cyclone.  
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APPENDIX 
Appendix A: Risk assessment 
Risk Assessment  
Since this study was undertaken using secondary data obtained from DTMR safety risks 
associated with the study was determined to be negligible.  
 Resource requirements 
• Statistical and analytical software 
• Electronic journal resources, secondary data from department of main roads 
• Digital camera and image analysis software 
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Appendix B-Cross section of a bridge 
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APPENDIX B: Level 1 bridge inspection report 
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APPENDIX C-Level 2 bridge inspection report 
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APPENDIX D: Primary data analysis using level 1 inspection reports 
Road drainage
Blocked inlets/outletsscour of outlet,embankment matarial defects surfacingsSettlements/Depressions
Structural IDName Material
628 Six mile creek Pre stressed ConcreteN N N N
632 Bobs Creek Pre Stressed concreteN N N N
635 Hut Creek Concrete N Y-AP1/PRO 1m3 scour side1,!m3 scour side 2,A2/PRO 10M3 scour side 1N N
636 Larcom creek Pre Streesed concreteN Y-AP1/PRO 20M3 embankment scour N N
637 Raglan Creek Pre Streesed concreteN Y-AP1/PRO 1m3 scour side1,!m3 scour side 2,A2/PRO 10M3 scour side 1Y-AP1/AP pushing typical Y-AP1/AP 40M2 depression typical
641 Station Creek Pre Streesed concreteN Y-AP2/PRO scour undermined inlet relive N Y-AP2/AP 30M settlemnt of relieve AP2/AP,side 2 AP2/AP relving slab voided at leasr 5.4M side1
650 Ramsay Creek Pre stressed ConcreteN N N N
658 Princhester Creek Pre Streesed concreteN N N N
662 Pine Mountain Creek Pre stressed ConcreteN N N N
664 Seven Mile Creek Pre stressed ConcreteN N N N
667 Unnamed Creek Pre stressed ConcreteN N N N
668 Deep Creek Pre stresses ConcreteN Y-AP1/side 2 hole in batter N N
669 Tooloombah Creek Pre stresses ConcreteN N N N
673 Gracemere Creek Pre stressed ConcreteN N N N
674 Middle Creek Pre stressed ConcreteN N N N
675 Neerkol creek NO1 Pre stressed ConcreteY Y-sever erotion Y-road collapsed Y-road collapsed
677 Neerkol Creek(No 2) Pre stressed ConcreteN Y N N
680 Sebastopol Creek Pre stressed ConcreteN N N N
682 Gogango Creek Pre stressed ConcreteN N N N
683 Sandy creek Pre stressed ConcreteN N N N
684 Googango Creek(NO 2)Pre stressed ConcreteN N N N
690 Woolian Creek Pre stressed ConcreteN Y Y Y
692 Four Mile Creek Pre stressed ConcreteN N N N
699 Grevillia Creek Pre stressed ConcreteN N N N
703 Kroombit Creek Pre stressed ConcreteN Y-scoured AP2 side2 N N
704 Dee River Pre stressed ConcreteN N N N
707 Collard Creek(No 4) Pre stressed ConcreteN N N Y-AP2/AP releiving slab settled 40MM
730 Don River Pre stressed ConcreteN Y-5M AP2 side1  scour to batter N N
754 Oaky Creek Pre stressed ConcreteN Y-AP1 18M scour N N
756 Headlow Creek Pre stressed ConcreteN Y-AP1/PRO 5M3 scour N N
757 Limestone Creek Pre stressed ConcreteY-AP2/PRO blocked by debrisN N N
760 Washpool Creek Pre stressed ConcreteN N N N
805 Nankin creek Pre stressed ConcreteN Y-embankment scour behind A1/WW1 N N
806 Coorooman creek Pre stressed ConcreteN N N N
814 Moores Creek Concrete N N N N
9011 Dgranite Creek Pre stressed ConcreteN Y-around A1-PRO side2 N N
13350 Palm Tree Creek Pre stressed ConcreteN N N N
25380 Poison Creek Concrete N N N N
25897 Portensia Creek(Part C)Pre stressed ConcreteN N N N
34318 South Kariboe Creek Pre stressed ConcreteN Y-AP2 PRO scour N N
35784 Kianga Creek Pre stressed ConcreteN Y N/A N
2 16 3 5
0.048780488 0.390243902 0.073170732 0.12195122
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Bridge surface Barriers water way
Rough joint transittoins material defects-surfacing Impact damage Damaged missing seals trees  under bridge Debris against structure River bank/embankment erotions
N N N Y-A2 joint exposed Y-debris at AP1 GR1,tree at AP1 GR2Y-dbris at AP1 GR1,tree at GR2 N
N N N N/A N N N
N Y-S2/WS pushing,cracks N N/A N N Y-S3/W 200M3 embankment scour
N N N N N N N
Y-AP1/AP 30MM transition typicalN N N N N N
N N N N/A N N N
N N N N/A N N N
N N N N N N N
N N N N N N N
N N N N/A N N N
N N N N N N N
N N N N N N N
N N N N N N N
N Y-S1/WS pushing N N/A N N N
N N N N/A N N N
Y-Road collapsed Y Y Y Y Y Y
N N N N N Y N
N N N N/A N N N
N N Y-S5/BR2,S2/BR2 N N Y N
N N N N N Y-p3/c2 N
N N N N N N Y-embankment erotion at span3
Y N N N/A N N N
N N N N N N N
N N N N N N N
N N N N/A N Y-GR and BR N
N N N N N N Y-Span 2 exposingh P2 columns
Y-AP1/AP 40MM transition N N Y-P2/J damaged seal N N N
N N N N/A N N N
N N N N/A Y-S2/W N N
N N N N/A N N N
N N N N N N N
N N N N/A N Y-timber against P2/P1 N
N N N N N Y-debris against side1 Y-span 1 side1 embankment errotion
N N N N/A N Y N
N N N N N Y-minor debris N
N N N N N N N
N N N N N Y-P1/P4 debris on side 2 N
N N N/A N/A N N N
N N N N N N N
N N N N/A N Y-debris against all GR N
N Y N Y Y N Y
4 4 2 2 4 12 6
0.097560976 0.097560976 0.048780488 0.048780488 0.097560976 0.292682927 0.146341463
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sub structure
Material defects General
Scour holes in bed piles/columns/braces/walesWalls/stems Head stocks Forward movements of abuments/wingsDebirs on shelf/bearingscour/erotion of spill through
N N N/A N N N N
N N N Y-P1-H cracking in bottom face N N N
N N N Y-P1/H 2M2 shallface N N N
Y-S1/W 400M3 scour N N N N N Y-A1/PRO settled/cracked,A2/PRO settled/cracked
N N Y-A1/A barrier wall broken N N N N
N N N N N N N
N N N N Y-movement and cracking A1/WW1 N Y-Embankment erotion water way A1
Y-localised scour at P2/P3 N N N N N N
Y-in water way mainly span 2 N N N N N N
Y-ABS/A1-large scour N/A N N Y-Cracking and settlement A1,A/ABSN/A N
N N N N N N Y-settlement both ABS PRO
N N N N N N N
N N N N N N Y-A2/side1 spill throughheavy scouring
N N N N N N N
N N N N Y-settlement A1/ABS N N
Y Y-severly damaged Y Y Y Y Y
N Y-cracked N Y N N N
N N N N Y-settlement of ABS N N
N Y N Y Y N Y
Y-localised scour P3/Column 1 N N N N N Y-Spill through  erotion at A2
Y-scour around P1.scour at base of A1 spill throughN N/A N N N N
N N N N Y N Y
N N N N N N Y-both voiding
Y-scour infront of A1 PRO N N N N N Y-A1 Pro severly damaged.A2 PRO damaged side2
N N N N N N N
N N N N N N N
N N N N N N N
N N N N N N N
N N N Y-P2/H diagonal stress cracks N N N
Y-S1/W 160M3 bed scour,S3/W 90M3 bed scourN Y-A2/ABS bases exposed by bed scourN N N N
Y-S1/W 160M3 bedscour,S3 50M3 bedscourN Y-ABS footing voided by bedscourN N N N
N N N/A N N N/A N
Y-Span1 N N N N N N
Y-Scour in S1/W near sill through baseN N N Y-spalling at base of A1/PRO side1 N N
Y-scouring under pier2 N N N N N N
N N N N Y-minor settlement A2/PRO N Y-A1 spill through
N N Y N Y N N
N N/A N N/A N N/A N/A
N N N/A N N N N
N N N/A N N N N
Y N N N N N N
14 3 5 6 10 1 11
0.341463415 0.073170732 0.12195122 0.146341463 0.243902439 0.024390244 0.268292683
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super structure
Material defects General
Dampeness/leakage from deck Girders deck Debris/dirt build up impact damage
N N N N N
Y-P1/H evidence of leaking typicalY-S1-D ASR cracking Y-S1/K1 ASR crackingN N
N N N N N
N N N N N
N N N N N
N N/A N N N
N N/A N Y-At A1 N
N N N N N
N N N N N
N N/A N N N
N Y N N N
N N N N N
N N N N N
N N/A Y-S4/D1 ASR crackingN N
N N/A N N N
Y Y Y Y Y
N N Y N N
N N N N N
N N N N N
N N N N N
N N N N N
Y Y Y N N
N N N Y-both water way spans at ABS need shapingN
N N N N N
N N N N N
N N N N N
N N N N N
N N N Y-GR.ABUT A2 N
N N N N N
N N Y-S2/D1 small spall end,ASR crack at S1/D2 typicalN N
N N Y-S3/D/ASR cracks up to 0.6MM typicalN N
N N N N N
N N N N N
N Y N N N
N N/A N N N
N N N N N
N N N N N
N/A N/A N Y-Dirt and Rock built up in cellN
N N N N N
N N/A N N N
N N N N N
3 5 7 5 1
0.073170732 0.12195122 0.170731707 0.12195122 0.024390244
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Road drainage Road surface
Blocked inlets/outletsscour of outlet,embankment matarial defects surfacingsSettlements/Depressions
679 Valentine Creek Timber N N N N
695 Banana Creek Timber N N Y Y
701 North Kariboe Creek Timber Y-All drains blocked N N N
702 Poor Mans Gully Timber N N N Y-AP2 settled 50mm
716 Banana Creek Timber N N N Y-minor depressioj at AP2
718 Roundstone Creek Timber Y-AP1/PRO MATERIAL BLOCKS DRAINAGE SIDE 1Y-AP2/PRO 1M3 SCOUR SIDE 1 Y-AP1/AP PUSHING/CRACKING SIDE 2Y-AP2/AP 9M2 DEPRESSION SIDE 1
724 Alma Creek Timber N N Y-AP2-AP debris and silt N
725 Dee River Timber N Y-AP2/PRO rivebank errosion Y-AP1/AP silt built up N
743 Nine Mile Creek Timber N Y-AP1/PRO1/21M3 scour,AP/PRO 1m3 scour N Y-AP2/AP 30M2 depression
749 Maxwellton Creek Timber N Y-AP1/PRO SCOURED AT A1 SIDE1 TYPICAL #4 AP1/PROY-15M2 BROKEN AWAY N
752 Doutful Creek Timber Y-AP1/PRO blocked by debrisY-AP1/PRO  scour side2,AP2/PRO scour 2M3 N N
767 Marble Creek Timber N Y-GR,near WS Y-AP1 side 2  bitument movement near road edgeN
768 Delcalgil Creek Timber N Y-0.5M scour side1 Y-AP2 has silt built up,AP2 2m rolledN
769 Ridler Creek Timber Y-AP2  pro blocked N N N
770 Boyne River (No1) Timber Y-AP1/PRO side 1-0.5M scourY- ide2 N N
771 Boyne River (NO 2) Timber Y-5M silted side 2.5m scour side1Y-AP1+AP2 5M scour on side Y-4M missing span 1,50MM thickN
774 Limestone Creek Timber N N Y-holes in AP2,wearing surface near transitionN
791 Stringy Bark Creek Timber N N N N
6 0.5 9 5
0.333333333 0.5 0.277777778
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Expansion joints water way
Rough joint transittoins material defects-surfacing Impact damage Damaged missing seals trees  under bridge Debris against structure River bank/embankment erotions
N N N N/A N Y N
Y Y-All typical degraded N/A N/A N/A N N/A
N N N N N N N
Y-AP2 settled 60MM N N N N N N
N N N N/A N N N
Y-AP2/AP 50MM TRANSITION Y-S1/WS CRACKING/PEELING/PUSHING TYPICALN A N/A N N N
N N N/A N/A N Y-S1/W N
N Y Y-S2-BR1 N/A N Y-S5-W N
Y-AP2/AP 40MM transition N N/A N/A N N N
N N/A N/A N/A N Y-S4/W FALLEN TREE/DEBRIS N
N Y-S1/WS extensive crackingN/A N/A N Y-S1/W N
N N N/A N/A N Y N
N Y-pavement cracked N/A N/A N Y-large logs N
N N N/A N/A N Y N
N N N/A N/A N Y-Large debris AP2 GR and span side 2N
N N N N/A N Y-up to 5m side1,Large log BR 2 span 3N
N N N N N Y-AGAINST A2 N
N N N/A N/A N Y-S1/W DEBRIS N
4 5 1 0 0 12 0
0.222222222 0.277777778 0.055555556 0.666666667 0
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Scour holes in bed piles/columns/braces/walesWalls/stems Head stocks Forward movements of abuments/wingsDebirs on shelf/bearingscour/erotion of spill through Dampeness/leakage from deck Girders deck Debris/dirt build up impact damage
Y-scouring around P1 and P2 N N N N N N N N N N N
N/A Y-cracked/rotten splicesN/A Y-P1/H2 rotating at pile seat N N Y-both a1/A2 Y-All typical Y-S1/G2vwell degraded Y-breaking,minor rotN/A N/A
N N N N N N N N N N N N
Y-MS PROPS  scoured side 1 N N N N N N N N N N N
N N N N N N Y-A2 N N/A N/A N N
N N Y-A1/ABS DROPPED 100MM/ Y-P1/H1 PITTING N N N N
Y-P1/COR7 
PUSHING/CRUSHING,P1/COR 1 N N N
N N N N N N Y-A1-ABS not supported N N N N N
N N N N N N N N N N Y-AP1-AP N
N N Y-A1/ABS dropped 200MM/A2/ww2 scouredY-A2/H2 15MM gap from A2/P4 Y-A2/WW2 220MM FORWARD AT TOPN Y-A2/A 300MM X 400MM FULL WIDTH VOIDY N/A N/A N N
N N N N N Y N N N N N N
N Y-A2/WW1 pile loose and leaningY-A2/WW1 top plsnk displacedN N Y-A1/H debris Y-A2/A scour voids,1.5M3 scour voids A1 side2N N N N N
N N N/A N N N Y-on bearing shelf N N N N N
N N/A N N/A N N N N N/A N/A N N
N N N/A N N N N N N N N N
N N N/A N N N N N N N N/A N/A
N N N N N N N N N N N N
Y-MINOR SCOUR AT BASE A1/ABSN N N N N N N N N N N
N Y N N N N N N Y N N N
3 3 3 3 1 2 6 2 3 1 1
0.166666667 0.166666667 0.166666667 0.166666667 0.055555556 0.111111111 0.333333333 0.111111111 0.166666667 0.055555556 0.055555556
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APPENDIX E:Primary data analysis using level 2 inspection reports 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Proability Probability Probability
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
5 5 0 N/A N/A
5 5 0 5 5 0 5 5 0
4 4 0 4 4 0 N/A
2 2 2 1 1 0.25 2 2 4 0 1 2 1 3 1 0
3 1 3 1 0 3 1 3 1 0.25 4 1 3 0.13
5 1 1 7 0.358333333 5 2 7 0.342857143 1 3 3 7 0.331428571
1 2 1 1 2 1 0 1 3 2 2 0 1 3 1 3 0
3 2 5 0.05 5 5 0.05 N/A
Span3 (B) Span3(A) Span4(B) Span 4(A)Span 2(After)Span 2(Before)
Struture ID Name Material ProbabilityNo of Girders Change of probability
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
743 Nine Mile Creek Timber X X 0.25 5 4 1 4 1 0
752 Doutful Creek Timber X X 0.25 5 5 5 0
768 Delcalgil Creek Timber X X 0 4 4 4 0
769 Ridler Creek Timber X X 0.25 4 3 1 4 0
770 Boyne River No 1 Timber X X 0 4 4 4 0.13
718 Roubdstone CreekTimber X X 0 7 5 2 7 0.342857143
771 Boyne River No 2 Timber X X 0 4 2 2 2 2 0
695 Banan Creek Timber X X 0.25 5 3 1 1 4 1 0.05
0.125
Original Struture(B) Original Struture(A) Span1(Before) Span1 (After)
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Probability Probability Probability of girder fauilure
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
N/A N/A 0
N/A N/A 0
N/A N/A 0
3 1 3 1 0 4 4 0 0.010416667
N/A N/A 0.031875
N/A N/A 0.049364286
N/A N/A 0
N/A N/A 0.01
0.012706994
Span 5(B) Span 5(A) Span 6(B) Span 6(A)
Probability Probability Probability
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
59 59 0 57 57 0 N/A
69 69 0 60 60 0 63 63 0
39 5 34 10 0.38 39 5 34 10 0.38 40 5 35 10 0.38
14.4 14.4 0 23.6 23.6 0 25.4 25.4 0
37.4 37.4 0 30.4 30.4 0 32.6 32.6 0
54 17 54 17 0 71 61 10 0.13 63 53 10 0.13
33 33 0 29.6 29.6 0 30.4 30.4 0
71 71 0.05 62 62 0 70 70 0.05
S2(B)S1(B M2) S1(A) S3(B) S3(A)S2(A)
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No of piles Probability No of piles Probability No of piles Probability
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
4 3 1 2 2 0.05 4 3 1 1 2 1 0.16 N/A
7 4 1 2 4 3 0.066 4 2 2 2 1 1 0.255 4 3 1 3 1 0
3 not visible not visible NV 3 2 1 2 1 0 3 3 3 0
3 3 2 1 0.38 3 3 2 1 0.38 3 2 1 2 1 0
3 2 1 2 1 0.25 3 2 1 2 1 0 3 3 3 0
7 3 2 1 1 5 1 1 0.05 5 5 3 2 0.102 5 4 1 5 0.05
3 3 3 0.25 3 1 2 2 1 0.25 3 3 3 0
6 1 5 6 0 4 1 2 1 1 3 0.1033333 4 1 1 1 1 1 3 0.27
P1(A) P2(B) P2(A)P1(B)A1(B) A1(A)
Probability Probability Probability og deck failure
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 4 1 2 3 4
N/A N/A N/A 0
70 70 0 N/A N/A 0
N/A N/A N/A 0.38
24.5 24.5 0.05 24.6 24.6 0.05 25.5 25.5 0.05 0.027028986
31.2 31.2 0 N/A N/A 0
71 61 10 0.13 N/A N/A 0.014130435
30.8 30.8 0 N/A N/A 0
N/A N/A N/A 0.034729064
0.056986061
S5B) S5(A) S6(B) S6(A)S4(B) S4(A)
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No of piles Probability No ofpiles Probability No of piles Probability No of piles ProbabilityProbability of pile failure
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
N/A N/A N/A 9 2 2 2 3 2 2 2 3 0 0.012352941
4 3 1 3 1 0.1325 N/A N/A 8 1 5 2 5 3 0.215 0.024759259
N/A N/A N/A 3 not visible not visible 0 0
3 2 1 1 2 0.315 3 1 2 2 1 0.215 3 3 2 1 0.38 3 1 2 1 1 1 0.186666667 0.088412857
3 2 1 1 2 0.253333333 N/A N/A 3 1 2 1 2 0 0.033553333
5 4 1 4 1 0 N/A N/A 7 1 3 3 5 1 1 0.15 0.012137931
3 2 1 1 2 0.25 N/A N/A 4 2 1 1 2 1 1 0 0.046875
N/A N/A N/A 8 6 2 8 0.05 0.019227273
0.029664824
P4(B) P4(A)P3(A) P5(B) P5 (A) A2(B) A2(A)P3(B)
Probability Probability No of sheeting ProbabilityNo of sheeting Probability of abutment sheeting failure
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
N/A N/A 0 14 13 1 13 1 0 58 52 6 52 6 0 0
N/A N/A 0 15 15 15 0 14 14 14 0 0
1 1 0 1 1 0 0 3.6 3.6 3.6 0 3.6 3.6 3.6 0 0
N/A N/A 0 5 5 5 0 16 16 14 2 0.016 0.012380952
N/A N/A 0 5 5 5 0.13 4 4 4 0 0
N/A N/A 0 18 18 18 0 20 20 20 0 0
N/A N/A 0 12.6 12.6 12.6 0 18 18 18 0.13 0.076470588
N/A N/A 0 26 26 26 0 26 6 19 1 26 0.05 0.025
0 0.014231443
Abutment ( Aprroah 1(A)) Abutment Sheeting (A2-B) Abutment Sheeting(A2-A)Abutment (Approh1 B) Abutment Sheeting (A2-A)Abutment 2 (Approh2 B)Abutment 2 (Approh2 B) Abutment Sheeting(A1-B)
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No of head stock No of head stock Noof head stock No of head stock  No of head stock
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
2 2 2 0 2 2 2 0.05 N/A N/A
2 2 2 0.05 2 2 1 1 0.255 2 2 1 1 0.15 2 1 1 1 1 0.09
0 N/A 1 1 1 0.25 1 1 1 0 N/A
2 1 1 1 1 0.215 2 1 1 2 0.05 2 2 2 0 2 1 1 1 1 0.19
2 2 2 0 2 1 1 1 1 0.25 2 2 2 0 2 2 1 1 0.38
2 2 2 0.05 2 2 1 1 0 4 4 3 1 0.0825 4 4 4 0.05
2 1 1 1 1 0.13 2 1 1 1 1 0.19 2 2 2 0.25 3 1 2 1 2 0
2 1 1 2 0.05 2 1 1 2 0.05 2 2 2 0 2 1 1 2 0.05
Head stock (Pile 3 A)Head stock (Pile 3 B)Head stock (Pile 1 A) Head stock (Pile 2 B) Head stock (Pile 2 A)A1 (B) A1(A) Head stock (Pile 1 B)
 No of head stock No Of HS No of HS Probability of head stock failure
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
N/A N/A 2 2 2 0 0.008333333
N/A N/A 2 2 1 1 0.115 0.066
N/A N/A N/A 0.125
2 1 1 2 0.05 2 1 1 1 1 0 2 1 1 2 0.05 0.04625
N/A N/A 2 2 1 1 0.25 0.088
N/A N/A 4 3 1 3 1 0 0.0578125
N/A N/A 2 2 1 1 0 0.051818182
N/A N/A 2 1 1 2 0.05 0.025
0.058526752
Head Stock (A2 B) Head Stock (A2 A)Head stock (pile 5 B)Hesad stock (pile 4  B) Hesad stock (pile 4  A) Head stock (pile 5 B)
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No of Corbels No of corbels No of corbels No of corbels
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
5 5 5 0 N/A N/A
5 4 1 4 1 0.25 5 5 5 0 5 5 4 1 0.13
4 4 4 0 4 4 4 0 N/A
4 4 1 3 0.13 4 4 4 0.13 4 4 4 0.13
4 2 2 4 0.25 4 3 1 2 1 1 0.13 4 3 1 3 1 0.13
7 1 3 1 2 7 0.364 7 1 1 3 2 7 0.312 7 2 4 1 7 0.29333
4 4 3 1 0.13 4 4 4 0 4 4 4 0
5 2 3 5 0.05 5 1 4 4 1 0.09 N/A
 Pile 1 corbles (B) Pile 1 corbels(A) Pile 2 corbels (B) Pile 3 corbels (A)Pile 3 corbels (B)Pile 2 Corbels (A)
No of corbels No of corbels Probability of corbels failure
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
N/A N/A 0
N/A N/A 0.025333333
N/A N/A 0
4 2 1 1 3 1 0.1167 4 2 2 1 3 0.13 0.0316875
N/A N/A 0.0425
N/A N/A 0.046142857
N/A N/A 0.010833333
N/A N/A 0.014
0.021312128
Pile 4 coels (B) Pile 5 coels (B) Pile 5 cobels (A)
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Struture ID Name Material ProbabilityNo of Girders Change of probability
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 708 Collard Creek NO3Pre streesed cocrete X X 0.25 8 4 4 4 4 0
2 650 Ramsay Creek Pre streesed cocrete X X 0 N/A N/A
3 674 Middle Creek Pre streesed cocrete X X 0.13 N/A N/A
4 680 Seastopol Creek o1Pre streesed cocrete X X 0.13 N/A N/A
5 707 Collard Creek No4Pre streesed cocrete X X 0 8 4 4 8 0.05
6 756 Hedlow Creek Pre streesed cocrete X X 0 N/A N/A
0.085
Original Struture(B) Original Struture(A) Span1(Before) Span1 (After)
Proability Probability Probability
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
4 4 1 4 3 0.09 4 4 2 6 0.05 N/A
N/A N/A N/A
N/A N/A N/A
N/A N/A N/A
4 4 8 0.05 3 4 1 8 0.05 N/A
N/A N/A N/A
Span 2(Before) Span 2(After) Span3 (B) Span3(A) Span4(B) Span 4(A)
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Probability Probability Probability
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
160 160 0 160 160 0 160 160 0
16 14 2 0.00625 16 14 2 0.00625 16 16 0
15 1 15 1 0.008666667 16 16 0 16 16 0
19 19 0 18 18 0 19 19 0
176 176 0 175 1 176 0 175.5 0.5 176 0
14 1 1 14 2 0.027142857 15 1 13 2 1 0.01533333 15 1 14 1 1 0.00333333
S1(A) S2(B) S2(A) S3(B)S1(B M2) S3(A)
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Probability Probability Probabilty Of Deck failure
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 4 1 2 3 4
N/A N/A N/A 0
N/A N/A N/A 0.004166667
N/A N/A N/A 0.002083333
19 19 0 N/A N/A 0
N/A N/A N/A 0
N/A N/A N/A 0.015269841
0.00358664
S6(A)S4(B) S4(A) S5B) S5(A) S6(B)
No of piles Probability No of piles Probability No of piles Probability No of piles
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
N/A N/A 2 not visible 0
5 not visible NV 4 4 3 1 0.05 4 4 4 0
5 not visible not visile NV N/A N/A
6 6 2 4 0.05 6 6 6 0 6 6 5 1 0.25 6
N/A 2 buried buried 0 2 buried buried 0
5 not visible not visible NV 5 5 5 0 5 5 5 0
P2(B) P2(A)A1(B) A1(A) P1(B) P1(A)
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Probability No ofpiles Probability No of piles Probability No of piles ProbabilityProbability of pile failure
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
N/A N/A N/A N/A 0
N/A N/A N/A 5 5 5 0 0.002777778
N/A N/A N/A N/A 0
6 5 1 0.25 N/A N/A 6 6 6 0 0.018333333
N/A N/A 0 N/A N/A 0
N/A N/A 0 N/A 5 not visible not visible NV 0
0.003518519
A2(B) A2(A)P3(B) P3(A) P4(B) P4(A) P5(B) P5 (A)
Probability No of sheeting ProbabilityNo of sheeting Probability Of abutment sheeting failure
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 Probability 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
1 1 0 1 1 0 0 10 10 10 0 N/A 0
1 1 0 1 1 0 0 12 12 12 0 N/A 0
1 1 0 1 1 0.05 0.025 14 13 1 14 0.23214286 N/A 0.232142857
2* 2* 0 2* 1 1 0.25 0.063 18 16.5 1.5 16.5 1.5 0 8 7 1 7 1 0 0
1 1 0 1 1 0 0 10 10 10 0 15 14 1 15 0.371 0.2228
1 1 0 1 1 0.05 0.025 16 15 1 16 0.234375 10 10 2 8 0.2 0.221153846
0.019 0.112682784
Abutment Sheeting(A2-A)Abutment (Approh1 B) Abutment ( Aprroah 1(A)) Abutment 2 (Approh2 B)Abutment 2 (Approh2 B) Abutment Sheeting(A1-B) Abutment Sheeting (A2-A) Abutment Sheeting (A2-B)
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No of head stock Noof head stock No of head stock  No of head stock
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
N/A 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 N/A
N/A 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 N/A
N/A 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0.05 N/A
N/A 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 0
N/A 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 N/A
N/A 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 N/A
Head stock (Pile 3 A)Head stock (Pile 1 B) Head stock (Pile 1 A) Head stock (Pile 2 B) Head stock (Pile 2 A) Head stock (Pile 3 B)
 No of head stock No Of HS No of HS Probability of head stock failure
1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4 1 2 3 4
N/A N/A N/A 0
N/A N/A N/A 0
N/A N/A N/A 0.025
N/A N/A N/A 0
N/A N/A N/A 0
N/A N/A N/A 0
0.004166667
Head Stock (A2 B) Head Stock (A2 A)Hesad stock (pile 4  B) Hesad stock (pile 4  A) Head stock (pile 5 B) Head stock (pile 5 B)
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